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Abstract 
Over-education may arise from the voluntary decisions of individuals to acquire more 
qualifications than those required in the workplace, such that over-education may have a 
signaling role that allows workers to compensate for the lack of certain other skills, or to 
gain access to the labor market. This paper analyses the signaling role of over-education 
in Spain, a country characterised by a strongly-segmented labor market with high 
unemployment levels, and a large number of over-educated. Using micro data for a 
representative sample of Spanish workers, three different methods are applied to provide 
evidence that educational mismatch plays a clear signaling role. Policy implications are 
derived to alleviate inefficiencies in the allocation of educational resources and in the 
incentives of workers to use over-education as a signal. 
 
JEL classification: I26, J24, J28 
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1. Introduction 
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In the literature of the economics of education, human capital and signaling theories are 
often advanced to explain the positive relationship between years of education (or 
credentials) and wages. If education is productivity-enhancing, then public funding of 
education is taken for granted (Annabi, 2017). By contrast, if education has only a 
signaling role, public expenditure on education is a waste of resources. Whereas the 
empirical consensus concludes that signaling may play a role, this is minimal compared 
with the productivity-enhancing role, and there is increasing evidence at the international 
level that a significant proportion of workers are employed in jobs requiring less 
education than they have obtained (OECD 2011). This phenomenon of over-education is 
a matter of great interest in current research (see the meta-analyses by Groot and Maassen 
van den Brink 2000; Rubb 2003, and the surveys by Hartog 2000; Sloane 2003; 
McGuinness 2006; and Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011). Whereas over-education is 
routinely considered to be suboptimal, a consequence of a mismatch due to search or job 
frictions, the increasing dispersion in ability and/or skills among equally-educated 
workers may induce individuals to voluntarily acquire more qualifications than those they 
can productively use in their jobs (McGuinness and Sloane, 2011).  
The potential role of over-education as a signaling device has been frequently 
overlooked in the literature. This low interest stems from the general belief that over-
education is a source of inefficiency and is a deviation from the rational behavior of 
individuals, since over-education entails lower wages than earned by equally-educated 
workers who are in properly-matched jobs. Under a signaling approach, however, over-
education may be inefficient at the social level, but it may, in fact, stem from rational 
individual behavior. Less experienced or less able workers may over-educate to signal 
employers that they are indeed qualified for a job, to compensate for the lack of other 
skills or to disguise themselves among other equally-educated, but more able, individuals. 
Firms may find over-education useful in assessing the ranking of a particular individual 
on the ability spectrum (Green et al. 2002), or as an indication of adaptive capacities 
(Lene 2011). The signaling role of over-education may be especially important in periods 
of recession, and/or in areas where unemployment is high, since the decision to invest in 
education is not only regarded as a way to have access to higher wages but also as a way 
of insuring against unemployment (Arulampalam 2001; Charlot et al. 2005; Fernandez 
2006). Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and Verhaest and Omey (2009) show that being 
unemployed produces a greater stigma than working at a job for which the individual is 
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over-educated. Similarly, Iriondo and Perez-Amaral (2016) argue that individuals who 
experience an involuntary job change and/or significant periods of unemployment are 
more likely to be over-educated. 
In this context, the excess of education may constitute an additional waste of resources 
when it is publicly funded, with social returns being below private returns (Iriondo and 
Perez-Amaral, 2016). Whether or not this is the case, policy measures aiming to reduce 
over-education -due to mismatch, mobility costs, or asymmetric information- may be 
insufficient if incentives for the voluntary acquisition by individuals of additional 
education remain. Additional policies should then be implemented in order to reduce the 
signaling role of over-education. The aim of this paper is to examine the possible role of 
signaling in the generalization of over-education in the Spanish labor market and the 
proposal of policies to alleviate the associated problems.  
Spain is an interesting case study for several reasons. First, from an international 
perspective, the proportion of over-educated workers is among the highest within the 
OECD countries (using the statistical method, OECD (2011) shows that one third of 
workers in Spain are over-educated and one fourth are severely over-educated).1 Second, 
employment protection legislation has been quite restrictive, at least until the last labor 
reform in 2012,2 which generated a strongly-segmented market between permanent and 
temporary workers. The temporary rate has been the highest within the EU, above 30% 
until the onset of the Great Recession, generating a dual market and favoring the volatility 
of employment over time (Bentolila et al. 2012).3 In this line, the Spanish unemployment 
rate has been consistently among the highest within the EU for decades, and has risen to 
values over 25% during the Great Recession. Third, returns to education are low 
compared to many EU countries (De la Fuente and Jimeno 2009) and they have declined 
over time (Felgueroso et al. 2016; Izquierdo and Lacuesta 2012; Murillo et al. 2012). All 
of this suggests an interest in studying the potential signaling role of over-education in 
Spain. 
                                                 
1 The statistical method is one of the ways of measuring over-education. OECD (2011) considers workers 
to be over-educated when the difference between the educational level achieved by the worker and that 
required for the job is just one level (in ISCED categories), with severe over-education being defined when 
the difference is greater than one level. 
2 The synthetic index used by the OECD to measuring rigidity in the labor market was over 3 in Spain in 
2006, the second highest within the OECD, and it has declined to a value slightly above 2, below the OECD 
average. 
3 The temporary rate has declined to a value around 25%, 10 percentage points lower than in 2005 but still 
among the highest within the EU. 
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An initial challenge is how to define over-education and how to measure it. We must 
first distinguish between over-education/educational mismatch and skill mismatch; and, 
second, we must specify how both types of mismatch are measured. As explained below, 
we use subjective indicators of education and skill mismatch, which are dictated by data 
availability. Specifically, our data comes from a representative national sample of 
Spanish workers combining objective information relative to personal and job/related 
characteristics, and subjective information on educational mismatch, working conditions, 
and attitudes towards work.  
We test the signaling role of over-education using three alternative methods; first, by 
comparing the returns to education between different groups of workers and different 
degrees of mismatch; second, by analyzing the attitude of workers to their educational 
mismatch; and, finally, by using an exogenous variation in educational legislation. With 
respect to the first method, we adapt the methodology in Wolpin (1977) and Riley (1979), 
and divide our samples into screened (wage earners) and unscreened workers (self-
employed), and then compare their rates of return. While the returns to over-education of 
the screened may be rewarding in both productivity gains and educational signs, those of 
the unscreened are purely due to productivity gains, so that the differences may be 
interpreted as revealing the signaling value of over-education; if differences are 
negligible, over-education has no signaling role. We carry out separate estimates for 
different types of educational and skill mismatch, as discussed below. Additionally, we 
control for selectivity into employment status and skill heterogeneity.  
The second approach includes different exercises exploring a common idea: how well 
the over-educated feel at the workplace and their willingness to move to other jobs. Our 
hypothesis is as follows. When individuals are over-educated, and probably not very 
satisfied in the current job, then they would search for another job in which they are not 
over-educated and more satisfied. This transitory stage in over-education would point to 
an absence of signaling. The third exercise consists of a natural experiment based on a 
change in educational legislation, derived from the implementation of a new education 
law in academic year 1991-92 (Ley Orgánica de Ordenación General del Sistema 
Educativo, LOGSE, passed in 1990) that replaced a previous one (Ley General de 
Educación, LGE, 1970). The key aspect of the new law is the extension of compulsory 
education from 14 to 16 years old. Our hypothesis is that, if individuals over-educate to 
signal, an extension in compulsory schooling would likely see an increase in over-
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education, since more years in non-compulsory schooling are now necessary to be able 
to launch a credible signal. Furthermore, the implementation of LOGSE took place at 
different times across the Spanish regions, which provides exogenous regional variations 
in which to test whether over-education increased after the inception of the new law.  
Our results show that returns to over-education in those groups in which signaling is 
unimportant (the self-employed) are lower. We interpret this as showing a signaling role 
of over-education. Nevertheless, the over-educated are found to be less job-satisfied and 
more prone to search for another job, indicating that they would prefer a job with a better 
match. Job satisfaction and willingness to change the job depend on the type of 
educational mismatch. Individuals we label as genuinely over-educated are less satisfied 
and more eager to move than those who are identified as apparently over-educated, so 
that the signaling role of over-education may vary across different groups of individuals. 
Finally, our natural experiment finds that the inception of the new law conveys a positive 
effect on over-education, which again supports the validity of the signaling role of over-
education. In this context, we discuss a range of sources for the role of over-education as 
a signal and what kind of policies would be helpful in reducing its effects. In general, 
education policies should aim to reduce the asymmetric information firms face when 
hiring new workers, such as abilities or skills, or institutional quality and fields of study. 
Further, pursuing a better adjustment between what the labor market demands and what 
workers supply, seems a reasonable objective. General labor market policies that strive 
for a reduction in unemployment, in fixed-term and in part-time contracts, and those 
reinforcing not only more and better education, but also the acquisition of appropriate 
skills, would reduce the need for individuals to obtain additional unproductive education. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a summary of the literature 
and Section 3 describes the data and the concept of mismatch used to study the signaling 
role of over-education. In Section 4, we study the returns to education, comparing wage 
earners with the self-employed. Section 5 analyses the relationship between educational 
mismatch and job satisfaction, job search, and job mobility. Section 6 uses the change in 
the educational law in 1990 as a natural experiment for studying the evolution of over-
education. Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review 
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Skill heterogeneity among equally-educated individuals makes over-education different 
from being over-skilled. Specifically, as education is only one of several individual skill 
components, it is not clear whether a person identified as over-educated would indeed 
have a negative job/qualification match if all skill components were taken into account. 
Over-educated workers may lack the necessary skills to perform more demanding jobs 
and use their “surplus” schooling to compensate for deficient human capital in other 
respects (Chevalier 2003; Green and McIntosh 2007). They are not, however, over-
educated, because not all aspects of their human capital are observed (Allen and van der 
Velden 2001; Green et al. 2002, Mateos-Romero et al., 2017). Thus, it is possible that a 
sizeable portion of the over-educated are only apparent because workers with a particular 
education level may have low values of other, unobserved, aspects of human capital, such 
as ability or other skills, leading to a negative correlation between ability and over-
education (McGuinness and Bennet 2007; Leuven and Oosterbeek 2011; Iriondo and 
Perez-Amaral, 2016). 4  In this view, over-educated workers are actually in jobs 
commensurate with their human capital, with this thereby explaining why the over-
educated are paid less than well-matched workers.  
It is in this context of skill heterogeneity among the over-educated where the signaling 
value of over-education may appear. Less experienced workers may over-educate to 
signal employers that they are indeed qualified for a job. Similarly, less able individuals 
may become over-educated, not only to compensate for the lack of other skills, but also 
to disguise themselves among other, now equally-educated, but more able, individuals. 
This idea is embraced by a more general view that assumes that individuals find 
incentives to systematically acquire more skills than they can productively use in their 
jobs. In the literature on the relationship between educational levels and earnings, diverse 
theories of signaling, filtering, credentialism, sorting, or screening - which we term as 
signaling, for short -, suggest that at least some of the skills acquired by workers are not 
actually needed to fulfil job tasks, but rather have the sole purpose of signaling the level 
of the worker’s productivity to potential employers who have only imperfect information 
                                                 
4 These low levels of skills can be of innate characteristics (McGuinness and Wooden 2009) or be due to 
the spread of tertiary education and college institutions, which has given rise to an increase in heterogeneity 
in the distribution of graduate abilities and of university quality (Chevalier 2003; Ordine and Rose, 2009). 
They may be also due to the choice of the academic degree, with large differences in the skills provided by 
humanistic and arts studies, in comparison to those provided by the sciences and engineering, more valued 
in the labor market (Frenette, 2004; Green and McIntosh, 2007). 
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(see Weiss, 1995, for a survey). Analogously, different models have been proposed in the 
literature on the use of an excess of education as a signal.  
Indirect evidence is presented in Albrecht and Van Ours (2006), who find that when 
there are channels other than education levels to provide information about worker 
productivity, the role of education in hiring new employees diminishes. On their part, in 
default of other information, firms may use over-education to sort individuals’ ability 
(Green et al. 2002; Lene 2011; Thurow 1975). By contrast, in some cases, workers may 
wish to mask their lack of skills. Thus, Ordine and Rose (2009) and Chevalier and Lindley 
(2009) find that the less-skilled become over-educated using low-quality institutions, to 
disguise themselves among other similarly-educated, but higher-skilled, workers. 
Similarly, Bedard (2001) shows that when access to university is restricted, low-ability 
workers find incentives to over-educate and mask their true skill level among a pool of 
graduate individuals. According to Arcidiacono et al. (2010), ability is observed nearly 
perfectly for college graduates, but is revealed to the labor market only gradually for high 
school graduates, so that starting wages markedly differ between both groups. 
Consequently, high-school graduates may find incentives to enrol in university to achieve 
higher earnings from the outset, right after being hired. A rather different view can be 
seen in Chatterji et al. (2003), where a theoretical model is developed in which firms pay 
an extra wage to the over-educated in exchange for paying efficiency wages to avoid 
monitoring costs and inducing a higher effort.  
In slack labor markets, where unemployment is substantial, over-education may be 
used also by individuals as a signal to either gain access to the labor market, to improve 
their position in wage bargaining, or to show adaptability to a changing environment in 
the job market (Charlot et al., 2005; Fernandez, 2006; Lene, 2011). Likewise, Charlot and 
Decreuse (2005, 2010) argue that over-education may arise in strongly-segmented labor 
markets with high unemployment, since the less-skilled want access to high-skill jobs due 
to the existence of matching frictions.  
This is the benchmark for our analysis. The Spanish labor market is marked by these 
two latter aspects: a very high unemployment rate (over 20% during the Great Recession), 
and strong differences across diverse groups of workers, fundamentally between 
permanent and temporary workers (Bentolila et al. 2012). For example, Ortiz (2010) finds 
that over-education is more common among permanent workers in Spain, since over-
education allows workers not to achieve a better match, but to secure a job. Similarly, 
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attaining credentials is frequently more valued than skill acquisition in Spain and other 
Southern European countries (OECD 2011), especially in the public sector (Dolado et al. 
2009; Ortiz 2010). Some other issues related to over-education and signaling also make 
Spain an interesting test case. First, despite that the average level of education is low 
(about 40% of the active population has attained compulsory educational level only; see 
Table A1 in the Appendix), it has increased steadily,5 producing high rates of over-
education, over 25%, especially among graduates (OECD 2011; Verhaest and van der 
Velden 2013). Second, in contrast to other countries, being a university graduate does not 
necessarily avoid being in a low-skill job in the early years of the career (Lene 2011). 
These aspects can be interpreted as emphasizing the signaling role that over-education 
may have in Spain.  
 
3. Data  
The data used in this paper come from the Spanish Quality of Work Life Survey (Encuesta 
de Calidad de Vida en el Trabajo, ECVT henceforth). The ECVT is an on-going 
programme which focuses on employment relationships and on the valuation and 
attitudes of employees towards work. The survey addresses the employed over age 16 as 
being representative of the total employed population, and covers a number of issues 
relating to working conditions, which allows us to control for a range of individual and 
job attributes. In particular, we focus on those that have to do with the human capital 
accumulation of individuals and their self-perceived job-match. Our sample of 28,730 
individuals is constructed from pooling the last four consecutive available waves, from 
2007 to 2010.  
Educational mismatch is computed from a subjective point of view.6 Specifically, we 
first make use of the worker’s responses to the following question.  
 Do you think that your current job is adequate according to your educational 
level? 
With the possible answers being 
1. Yes, correct. We label this as adequately educated 
2. No, below. We label this as over-educated 
                                                 
5 According to OECD, in 1992, 15% of the population between 25 and 64 had attained tertiary education. 
In 2015, the percentage had increased to 35.8%. 
6 General assessments of this and alternative measures can be seen in Hartog (2000) and Groot and Maassen 
van den Brink (2000). 
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3. No, above. We label this as under-educated 
4. No, different. We label this as mismatched. 
Almost 78% of sample individuals consider they hold a job position that adequately 
matches their attained educational levels, with around 19% declaring they feel over-
educated. Provided that less than 3% of surveyed individuals choose answers 3 and 4, we 
discard these individuals in our analyses. 7  As a consequence, the selected sample 
ultimately consists of 27,927 observations, of which 10,482 (37.5%) correspond to 
women and 17,445 (63.5%) to men; 5,397 (19.2%) correspond to the self-employed. 
A second question we consider is: 
 To what extent is your educational level useful for your job? 
Each individual rates between 0, not at all, and 10, very much. Near one half of 
surveyed individuals rates below 7 (the median value is 7.2). In order to keep things more 
tractable, we consider that the portion of the sample rating between 0 and 5 have acquired 
educational skills that are hardly applicable to their jobs (non-useful skills), whereas the 
half rating 6 or above are thought to make great use of their acquired educational skills 
(useful skills).8  
Taking responses to both questions, we can construct a classification of employees 
according to a self-evaluated mismatch (see Table 1). We define as “properly matched” 
those who answer 1 to the first question and simultaneously rate 6 or more to the second 
question. They represent almost two thirds of the whole sample. Those who answer 2 to 
the first question are labelled as over-educated. During the period 2007-2010, the average 
proportion of the over-educated is near 19%. We can distinguish between “apparent”, 
those who report 6 or above to the second questions, and “genuine”, those who report 5 
or below. More than one half of over-educated (10.5% of the total observations) report 
that they perform tasks that are closely related (6 or more) to their educational level. Thus, 
they are apparently over-educated. Consequently, only 8.8% of all individuals can be 
considered as genuinely over-educated. The remaining individuals, about 15% of 
observations, correspond to individuals who report there is not much of a relationship 
                                                 
7 Apart from a possible reluctance of individuals to acknowledge being under-educated or mismatched, it 
is reasonable to consider that experience and on-the-job training may help workers to reduce the self-
perception of being under-educated or mismatched. That is, a lower-than-required educational attainment, 
or a different array of skills for a specific job, may be counterbalanced by more continuous training, or 
learning-by-doing, so that the employee feels that, eventually, education and/or skills more appropriate to 
the requirements of that particular job will be acquired.  
8 Other possibilities have been also considered in estimations. Although the percentage of individuals in 
each group varies, estimated results do not significantly change with respect to those presented in the next 
sections. 
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between their realized studies and the tasks they perform at work. These are more difficult 
to classify; we designate them as “unadjusted”.9 These four categories extend the notion 
of over-education to a more ample view of educational and skill mismatch. These will be 
considered in our subsequent analyses to partially control for skill heterogeneity among 
individuals. 
(Table 1 about here) 
 
4. Returns to education 
Most of the literature agrees that over-education generates a wage penalty, relative to an 
equally-educated worker in a matched job, and a wage premium, relative to a less-
educated worker in a well-matched job.10 In this context, an important question is whether 
this wage premium is due to a productivity-enhancing effect only, or if, additionally, 
signaling may also be at work. In the education literature, the productivity-enhancing role 
of education is usually tested, as predicted by the human capital theory, against its 
signaling role, following different approaches (see Riley, 2001, for a survey; and 
Chevalier et al., 2004, for a recent analysis in the UK). One of these tests is to distinguish 
between workers who require screening and workers who do not. In unscreened sectors, 
a worker’s productivity can be easily ascertained, hence educational signaling is 
unimportant. In this line, the earlier work by Wolpin (1977) and Riley (1979) settles the 
basis for making comparisons, through the estimation of Mincerian-type wage equations, 
between screened and unscreened and comparing their rates of return. If returns to 
education among the unscreened (self-employed) exist, they can only be attributed to 
productivity effects since they do not need to signal. On the other hand, among the 
screened (wage earners), returns to education comprise both productivity and signaling 
effects so that their returns are expected to be greater.11  
                                                 
9 Thus, we extend Chevalier (2003), and others, by explicitly considering the group of those workers who, 
despite being in a matched job, report being disappointed with their education/job match. For a similar 
approach, see Mateos-Romero et al. (2017). 
10 Groot and Maasen van den Brink (2000) conducted a cross-country meta-analysis of 25 studies using 
various subjective and objective measures of over-education. The study reported that the “mean” return to 
a year of required education was 7.9%, a year of surplus education, 2.6%, and a year of deficit education, -
4.9%. Whereas the choice of definition had a large effect on the incidence of over-education, the authors 
did not find any of the methodological approaches to significantly influence estimated returns (for similar 
results, see Rubb 2003). This has led some commentators to claim that measurement errors may then not 
be a problem (McGuinness, 2006) while others has criticised this conclusion (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 
2011). 
11 Diverse evidence confirms that returns to education are lower among the self-employed (see Brown and 
Sessions 1998; García-Mainar and Montuenga-Gomez 2005 and references therein).  
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Along these lines, we can carry out an analogous analysis focusing on over-education, 
by comparing returns between these different groups of workers to test the signaling 
hypothesis. If over-education is productivity-enhancing, we should observe positive 
returns from over-education for both the screened and the unscreened, with these returns 
being greater for the screened since they include the signaling value. At the same time, if 
returns are higher for those workers who are adequately matched, relative to those who 
are over-educated, a wage penalty for over-education should exist. If over-education does 
not have a productivity-enhancing role, positive returns from over-education for the 
unscreened should not be observed, and potential positive returns from over-education to 
the screened would be completely due to a signaling role.  
To test these possibilities, and in order to consider education and skill mismatch, we 
estimate the Mincer-type wage equation (1) and compute the rates of returns from a year 
of education for the four types of employed previously defined: 
ln wi =  + 0 Edui +1 Unad.i +2 Appar_ overed.i + 3 Genu_overed.i +’Xi + i    (1) 
where Edu is years of education, and X includes experience in quadratic terms. No other 
controls are added in order for β0 to fully capture the link between education and earnings. 
Unad., Appar_overed., and Genu_overed. are dummy variables indicating the group to 
which the worker belongs. 0 is the return to education of a properly-matched worker. 
The sum 0+1 captures the educational return for the unadjusted; 0+2 the 
corresponding return to the apparently over-educated; and, finally, 0+3 the return to the 
genuinely over-educated. We prefer this specification to others commonly used in the 
literature, with separate samples, because we avoid estimation problems due to the 
reduced size of the over-educated sample. 
In the survey, there is no information about required education, so that Edu represents 
attained schooling. The educational level is reported by the interviewed individuals, 
according to 9 categories. To convert this information into years of education, we 
associate to each educational level the number of years required to achieve the 
corresponding credential. These are presented in Table A1 in Appendix A. Since 
individuals in the sample have been educated under different educational schemes, the 
educational categories are defined differently before and after 1992, so that we must 
consider the age of the individual when assigning the number of years. Our measure of 
income is net monthly full-time individual earnings, which respondents categorized into 
one of 9 possible income brackets. We arbitrarily assign the value of €500 and €6,500 for 
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the first and for the last open-ended brackets (less than €600 and more than €6,000, 
respectively).  
Equation (1) is estimated following the interval regression (Stewart, 1983). This 
expression serves for comparing returns to education among wage earners and self-
employed. Results of estimating equation (1) for the four groups defined are presented in 
Table 2 (Panel A) where the estimates correspond to the sum of the estimated coefficient 
0 (the properly-matched) plus the conforming i for each group (i=1,…,3). 
(Table 2 about here) 
We first note that mismatch imposes a wage penalty, which is different for each 
degree of mismatch. The penalty for wage earners is of a magnitude close to 15% for the 
unadjusted; it increases to values around 23% for the apparently over-educated; and 
reaches values of about 40% for the genuinely over-educated. A similar pattern is 
observed in the subsample of men and women, with returns for women again being higher 
than those of men, and suffering lower penalties from the mismatch. In the case of the 
self-employed, the penalties follow a steeper profile, since returns for the genuinely over-
educated are approximately one half of those for the properly-matched.  
Several conclusions may be drawn from these results. First, the estimated coefficients 
are all statistically significant and different from zero, indicating that additional years of 
education are associated with higher earnings. Second, returns are higher for wage earners 
than for the self-employed, with these results holding for the overall sample as well as for 
the male and female subsamples. This confirms that education and over-education both 
play a double role as productivity-enhancing and as a signal, with the signaling value of 
over-education being higher for women. Third, being mismatched is penalized with lower 
wages. Fourth, penalties for the genuinely over-educated are considerably higher than 
those for the unadjusted and apparently over-educated, confirming the existence of 
heterogeneity among similarly educated individuals. 
At this point, we take into account the existence of two possible sources of bias: self-
selection into type of employment,12 and time- invariant unobserved heterogeneity. We 
deal with selectivity into self- or paid-employment using Heckman’s procedure, by 
adding a selection equation including the same regressors as in equation (1), plus several 
dummies indicating the father’s occupational category and an additional dummy 
indicating whether the mother was working when the respondent was sixteen years old. 
                                                 
12 Given that our sample is of the employed only, we do not control for selectivity into employment. 
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These variables are supposed to explain the decision to work in a particular group, but are 
not to affect wages. Results shown in Panel B in Table 2 are similar to those in Panel A,13 
so that selectivity bias may be unimportant for the returns.  
Regarding unobserved heterogeneity, some authors, such as Chevalier (2003), 
Frenette (2004), and Tsai (2010) show that when controlling for it through fixed effects 
estimations, or explicitly dealing with distributional skills or the field of specialization, 
the wage penalty for over-education is reduced, and may even disappear. These results 
lead to the contention that many individuals who are considered as over-educated in fact 
are not, because some of the skills and abilities they possess do not match those needed 
in their jobs at the corresponding educational level, and thus they are only apparently 
over-educated.  
The way we investigate this issue is dictated by data availability. In addition to 
considering the four types defined from the self-perception of individuals about the job 
match, as in Table 2, and given that our data is not in longitudinal form, we construct a 
pseudo-panel to control for heterogeneous skill distribution. We divide the sample into 
homogeneous groups (cohorts) according to different variables, to form a panel structure 
of the data. This is undertaken by computing the mean value in each variable for any 
individual according to the two genders, 17 NUTS II regions, 4 years, 2 labor statuses 
(self-employed and wage earner), and four types of adjustment (no mismatch, unadjusted, 
apparently over-educated, and genuinely over-educated). These sample means act as 
proxies for the population means since the sample size is sufficiently large. This makes 
up a total of 1,632 observations, with earnings calculated as the log of the mean value in 
each interval. 
ctctctctctctct XoveredGenuoveredApparUnadEduw
 
   ._
3
._
2
.
10
ln     (2) 
Equation (2) is estimated by fixed effects and controlling for self-selection where each 
panel cell is weighted by the number of observations in the first year of the sample, 2007 
(Wooldridge 1995). Estimates are shown in Panel C in Table 2.14 The pattern observed is 
similar to that discussed in previous estimates. This again confirms the signaling value of 
over-education and suggests that the estimation of the enhancing-productivity role of 
over-education is not strongly affected by unobserved heterogeneity. Our results, hence, 
                                                 
13The results of the first stage are not shown, to save space, but are available on request. 
14Men and women subsamples are not estimated due to the reduced sample size. 
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coincide with those of Green and McIntosh (2007), McGuinness and Bennett (2007), 
Chevalier and Lindley (2009), Green and Zhu (2010), and Lene (2011), who use different 
ability measures, and find that a wage penalty for the over-educated does exist. Similarly, 
Dolton and Silles (2008), Korpi and Tahlin (2009), Verhaest and Omey (2012), Iriondo 
and Perez-Amaral (2016) control for selection bias and measurement error issues and still 
arrive at the finding that workers earn more in adequate jobs for which they are over-
educated.15  
 
5. Job satisfaction, job search and job mobility. 
In this section, we investigate whether different aspects related to educational mismatch 
in the workplace, such as job satisfaction or voluntary turnover, may be considered as 
indicators of the presence of signaling in over-education. In principle, mismatched 
workers may feel no, or little, job satisfied and may then look for another job in which 
they can feel better off. However, empirical evidence on the topic is far from reaching 
homogenous conclusions. Whereas some authors have shown that the over-educated are 
less satisfied in their jobs than adequately-matched workers and hence more prone to 
search for another job (Tsang et al., 1991; Verhaest and Omey, 2009), others have 
provided empirical evidence supporting the absence of a relationship between over-
education and job satisfaction (Groot and Maassen van den Brink, 2000; Büchel, 2002) 
and even a positive relationship between over-education and firm productivity 
(Kampelman and Ryck, 2012). Sloane (2003) argues that, unlike educational mismatches, 
skill mismatches have a strong negative impact on job satisfaction (see also, Allen and 
van der Velden, 2001; and Green and Zhu, 2010). 
One possible explanation for these non-conclusive results, which we explore in this 
section, is that individuals who over-educate to signal may be no less satisfied than the 
adequately-matched if they aim to mask or compensate for their lack of skills, or for 
access to employment. In these circumstances, they may have no incentive to look for 
another job and would remain mismatched for a very long period in their career. By 
contrast, individuals who are genuinely mismatched probably feel very unsatisfied and 
                                                 
15 Iriondo and Perez-Amaral (2016) find that the return of an additional year of schooling above the job 
educational requirements is small. However, they observe a distinct behavior across ages: wages of workers 
under 35 largely depend on educational attainment, while those of workers over 35 depend mainly on job 
educational requirements. 
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would try to look for new jobs providing a better match, implying that the mismatch 
would be of a transitory nature.  
Our database allows us to study these aspects of job satisfaction, job search, and job 
mobility in order to provide some insights into the signaling role of over-education. With 
respect to the first two aspects, the ECVT asks the surveyed individuals to rate from 0 
(no) to 10 (very high) their job satisfaction at the current work and whether or not they 
are looking for another job. To study the first aspect, we use a standard job satisfaction 
equation which regresses job satisfaction on the same set of independent variables as in 
equation (2), plus others including gender, tenure, marital status, three dummies 
indicating having children (of different ages), a dummy indicating whether it is the first 
job, and dummies of industry, occupation, and years. This is estimated by ordered probit, 
where self-selection is addressed with the same controls as in Section 4. 
In Table 4, we present the marginal effects of a change in the mismatch status, with 
the reference category being properly matched, on the probability of achieving a high 
score (8 or above) on the job satisfaction scale. For both groups of workers, wage earners 
and the self-employed, the genuinely over-educated are the most dissatisfied, followed 
by the apparently over-educated, and then the unadjusted. The same pattern is observed 
when considering men and women separately. We interpret these results as the unadjusted 
and the apparently over-educated obtaining gains in job satisfaction with respect to the 
genuinely over-educated (for a similar result in the UK, see Green and Zhu, 2010). The 
loss in job satisfaction is somewhat smaller for the self-employed than for wage earners, 
except in the case of the apparently over-educated, which suggests some signaling value 
of over-education. Specifically, workers in the screened group feel more damaged by 
mismatch than do the unscreened, which may be indicating higher expectations than those 
we would otherwise expect from more years of education in an adequate match. 
(Table 3 about here) 
The second aspect, job search, is investigated by estimating the probability of looking 
for another job. We do not have data on whether the search effectively results in a move; 
it is only capturing intention, not an accomplishment. Specifically the question in the 
survey reads as: Are you looking for another job?, where possible answers are Yes or No. 
Table 4 shows the estimates of a probit equation where self-selection is also controlled 
for. The regressors, both in the probit and in the participation equations, are the same as 
in the job satisfaction case. Results show that the genuinely over-educated are more prone 
to search for another job, with the apparently over-educated showing lower coefficients. 
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The incentives to voluntary turnover are even lower, but statistically significant, in the 
case of the unadjusted.  
(Table 4 about here) 
We now control, in addition to self-selection, for unobserved heterogeneity through 
pseudo-panel estimation as defined in Section 4, using OLS. Results are shown in the 
lower parts of Tables 3 and 4. The general pattern is similar to those obtained with the 
pooled data. The worse the match, the greater the reduction in job satisfaction, and the 
greater the incentives to search for another job. We note, however, that incentives to 
voluntary turnover, if unadjusted, are not statistically or significantly different from those 
properly matched.  
The results from these two exercises show that the genuinely over-educated are the 
least satisfied and the most willing to look for another job. The apparently over-educated 
and the unadjusted do not feel as punished by mismatch as the genuinely over-educated. 
They obtain some gain from educational mismatch, which we may interpret as the 
credentials obtained by those two groups having some signaling value, even though they 
are not as satisfied at the workplace as those who are adequately educated. 
This evidence on signaling is quite indirect. Ideally, we would like to test this on more 
specific grounds. For example, if we could have information on actual individual job 
mobility, and not only on prospects of job mobility, we could check whether the move 
has actually taken place, if mismatch has been reduced after the job change, and if 
satisfaction has improved. We do not have such data but, using the information available, 
Garcia-Mainar and Montuenga-Gomez (2017) analyse the “temporary” nature of each 
mismatch by comparing the situation at present with that at the first job. They find that, 
at least part of the initial mismatch seems to be resolved throughout the professional 
lifetime/career of individuals. However, not all the initial mismatch disappears, even for 
those in older cohorts, suggesting that some degree of mismatch persists over time, which, 
among other explanations, may also be due to signaling in over-education. They argue 
that Spanish workers may over-educate to signal in order to get into employment, but 
once there they feel less than fully satisfied and try to look for another job which may 
better fit their skills. 
 
6. The increase in the minimum school leaving age 
In this section, we follow Bedard (2001) and Chevalier et al. (2004) who, based on Lang 
and Kropp (1986), exploit differences in education levels in response to a change in the 
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minimum level of education. The rationale is that, under the signaling view, exogenous 
increases to schooling would affect an individual’s ranking. That is, any reform that 
affects the education decision of a specific group will have a spillover effect on other 
groups not directly affected; if a low-productivity group were to increase its education 
because of a policy intervention, the more productive group would also want to invest in 
more education in order to continue to distinguish themselves from the less- educated. 
The Spanish educational law LOGSE, passed in 1990, increased the number of 
compulsory schooling years from 8 to 10, by extending the minimum school leaving age 
from 14 to 16 years old. This change in legislation has been explored to check its influence 
on two recent features of the Spanish economy: the halt in the declining trend in dropout 
rates (Felgueroso et al. 2014), and the cognitive development following the introduction 
of universal high-quality childcare for 3-years-old (Felfe et al. 2015). The hypothesis 
investigated in this section is whether the implementation of this new educational law in 
academic year 1991-92 (which replaced the previous LGE) contributed, among other 
factors, to increase over-education.  
We carry out two different exercises to test the signaling hypothesis. In both cases, 
we make use of the fact that the LOGSE was rolled out at different times across regions 
within Spain. First, following Duflo (2001) and Felgueroso et al. (2014), we construct an 
exposure to LOGSE index that serves as an identification strategy to analyse whether the 
change in the law contributed to increasing over-education. This is a reasonable natural 
experiment exercise, since the differences in timing and velocity for each region of 
carrying out the LOGSE were uncorrelated with the initial level of over-education of these 
regions, since they were due to (region) political and organizational factors.16 In the 
second case, we follow Felfe et al. (2015) and test our hypothesis within a standard 
differences-in-differences model (DiD). In both approaches, we estimate the influence of 
the change in the educational law on a variable capturing education and skill mismatch.  
In the first case, the main difficulty in testing the effect of the law change in over-
education is that the system, for a particular individual studied, is unknown. Since the 
introduction of the LOGSE progressed differently across schools and regions, we do not 
know exactly whether an individual was exposed to the change or not. We must then use 
an instrument that allocates the level of exposure to the LOGSE to each individual. We 
can clearly consider three periods: before 1991, only the LGE was in place and hence 
                                                 
16 Felfe et al. (2015:395) claim that “the timing of implementation varied considerably across regions due 
to a scarcity of qualified teachers and constraints on classroom space in existing primary schools”. 
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treatment=0 for all individuals; between 1991 and 1999, both the LGE and LOGSE 
coexist, with differences across regions, and hence some individuals will be allocated to 
0 and others to 1, depending on their region; from 2000 onwards only LOGSE is in place 
so treatment=1 for all individuals. In consequence, the index of exposure is constructed 
as follows: 1 if exposed to the LOGSE, zero if exposed to the LGE and a number between 
0 and 1 indicating the probability of exposure to LOGSE. The exposure index is 
calculated as the percentage of individuals of each cohort who are in LOGSE in their 
region in the secondary and bachelor level. 
We estimate equation (3) which, besides the individual index of exposure to the 
LOGSE, includes the same variables as in previous specifications, plus regional variables 
Yiqr = + X’iqr+ Iiqr + Zqr + uiqr      (3) 
where Yiqr denotes the dependent variable (educational mismatch) of individual i from 
birth cohort q in region r, X is a vector of individual and labor characteristics, I denotes 
the exposure level, and Z is a regional variable, the unemployment rate. Equation (3) is 
estimated under three different specifications: i) an ordered probit model in which the 
dependent variable is an ordered variable on the level of mismatch: it takes value 1 for 
properly/matched, 2 for unadjusted, 3 for apparently over-educated, and 4 for genuinely 
over-educated; ii) a probit model in which the dependent variable is a dummy with value 
1 if the individual is over-educated and 0 otherwise; finally, iii) an OLS model with the 
same dependent variable as in case i) and clustering standard errors at the region level.17 
In the case of the DiD estimation model, the specification to be estimated is: 
Yiqr = + X’iqr+ Tiqr +  Postt +(T x Post)iqrt + Zqr + uiqr  (4) 
where T is a binary variable indicating whether or not individual i lives in one of the fast-
implementing regions. Following Felfe et al. (2015), we select in this group those regions, 
the fast regions, in which the proportion of pupils affected in the first year after the 
passage of the law was higher than 50%.18 Post is a dummy equal to 1 if, for each year, 
the individual had the corresponding age to be affected by the LOGSE, in the case where 
the law was passed in all regions at the same time, and 0 otherwise. 19  Finally, the 
                                                 
17 The difference between specifications in cases i) and iii) is the assumption of ordinality or cardinality in 
the dependent variable. Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters (2004), among many others, show that estimated 
results from one or another specification are qualitatively similar. 
18 These fast regions are Asturias, Aragon, Balearic Islands, Castile-Leon, Castile-La Mancha, Catalonia, 
Extremadura, Murcia, Navarre, and Rioja. Andalusia, the Basque Country, Canary Islands, Cantabria, 
Galicia, Madrid and Valencia, are considered as the slow regions. 
19 In the sample, we only include those who were born between 1966 and 1986, since individuals born after 
1986 were all affected by the reform. 
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treatment variable T is interacted with variable Post, and Z captures the same regional 
variable as in equation (3). This model is estimated by OLS clustering of standard errors 
at the region level. 
Results of estimating equations (3) and (4) appear in Tables 5 and 6, respectively. 
Table 5 shows the results of the index of LOGSE exposure variable, I, in the three 
alternative estimations.20 The results indicate that more exposure to LOGSE is associated 
with a higher degree of education mismatch for all workers, a result that is fundamentally 
driven by the women’s case, since this variable is not significant in the men’s subsample. 
Only when estimating by a probit is the coefficient for the whole sample non-significant.  
(Table 5 about here) 
Table 6 shows the results for the DiD analysis. The interaction term Treatment x Post 
measures the average effect of the increase in over-education in fast regions, versus the 
increase in over-education in slow regions. This variable is significant and positive, 
indicating a clear effect of the law change. For this estimate to be causal, the assumption 
of common trends needs to be fulfilled. Two placebo tests have been estimated to test it. 
Placebo Test 1 considers a random assignment of the fast regions. Specifically, we 
consider that the fast regions are those in the second half, when they are sorted by 
alphabetical order, with the Treatment x Post variable found to be non-significant. The 
same occurs with Placebo Test 2 that considers that the reform affected workers with year 
of birth between 1961 and 1970 only.  
(Table 6 about here) 
Both approaches confirm the notion that a mandatory increase in the minimum school 
leaving age causes all education levels to rise, for more able individuals to still signal 
their ability, compared to less able individuals, thus spreading the phenomenon of over-
education. Therefore, a signaling value of over-education is clearly found in the Spanish 
labor market.  
 
7. Conclusions 
Testing the signaling role of education is important in assessing whether public financing 
of education is a waste of resources. This task has become more important in recent 
decades, when the phenomenon of over-education has proliferated, especially in 
                                                 
20 In the first estimation, an ordered probit, the coefficient is not interpreted directly and it is necessary to 
calculate the marginal effects. We have ensured that these marginal effects indicate more mismatch with a 
higher index level. 
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developed countries. Over-education has been basically considered as an inefficient result 
of the matching process. However, various studies have provided some evidence 
supporting the idea that over-education may result from the rational behaviour of 
individuals. Workers who lack certain skills, or who find it difficult to enter into 
employment may over-educate to overcome these difficulties, reaching positions which 
otherwise they could not attain.  
In this paper, we use several approaches to test the validity of a signaling role in over-
education. We study Spain as an interesting case since its labor market is characterized 
by a large number of over-educated workers, high unemployment, strong segmentation, 
and clearly declining returns to education over time - all circumstances that favor the 
expansion of over-education. The data used in this work come from a national 
representative sample of Spanish workers combining objective information relative to 
personal and job-related characteristics and subjective information on attitudes to work 
and education variables. We test the signaling role of over-education using three 
alternative methods; first, by comparing the returns to over-education among different 
groups of workers and different degrees of job mismatch; by analyzing the extent of the 
relationship between educational mismatch and job satisfaction, job search, and job 
mobility; and, finally, by using an exogenous variation in educational legislation. 
Our results show that returns to over-education in those groups in which signaling is 
unimportant (the self-employed) are lower. This result is robust against biases coming 
from self-selection or individual heterogeneity. The over-educated are found to be less 
job-satisfied and more prone to search for another job, indicating that they would prefer 
a job with a better match. It is noted that job satisfaction and willingness to change the 
job depend on the type of educational mismatch. That is, some of the over-educated do 
not really feel much less satisfied than those who are adequately-matched, and it may be 
that they have voluntarily decided to over-educate themselves, perhaps to avoid the signal 
that they have lesser skills, or to escape from unemployment. Finally, our natural 
experiment finds that the inception of the new law conveys a positive effect on over-
education, which again supports the validity of the signaling role of over-education. 
Given the heterogeneous distribution of skills across workers, we show that the 
signaling role of over-education is not the same across groups of the mismatched. The 
unadjusted and apparently over-educated are not so very different from the adequately-
matched, compared to the genuinely over-educated, for whom most of over-education is 
indeed a consequence of a poor match, and who are willing to abandon their status of 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 20 
over-educated. Our results confirm that some part of self-perceived over-education is 
productivity-enhancing, and is then partially compensated with extra rewards. However, 
a sizeable level of over-education is found to be due to signaling; that is to say, workers 
acquire more than productive education. The idea that over-education is the result of 
mismatch due to inefficiencies in the labor market has led to suggestions of policy 
interventions both in the labor market functioning and in the education system. 
Regarding labor market, active labor market policies pursuing more information on 
workers and vacancies for achieving a better match, extending training over time through 
life-long learning, or favouring hiring conditions to firms, are all reasonable proposals to 
reduce the expansion of over-education (Iriondo and Perez-Amaral, 2016). This is 
especially true in the case of Spain, where the unemployment rate among younger 
workers, the long-term unemployment rate, and the temporary rate are all remarkably 
high. These policies would also help in reducing the incentives for some workers to use 
over-education as a way to escape from unemployment or job insecurity. 
A second line of attack is to reform the education system. The objective is to bring 
together what firms demand and what workers may offer. Among other things, the 
educational system should provide individuals with the skills firms require, and better 
career guidance to improve the match (Iriondo and Perez-Amaral, 2016). For the former 
point, measures such as early child intervention and the avoidance of grade retention 
(Agasisti and Cordero, 2013, 2017; Heckman et al., 2013; Pedraja-Chaparro et al., 2015), 
as well as upgrading teacher performance (Hanushek, 2011 and Meroni et al., 2015) may 
be useful. For the latter, public information about the fields of specialisation that firms 
demand would help high school students to know which studies and majors would allow 
for better prospects in the labor market. 
These recommendations would not be sufficient in themselves, however, if observed 
over-education is a consequence, at least partially, of signaling. We have discussed in this 
paper the various ways in which individuals voluntarily decide to over-educate. Since this 
additional education generates additional waste of effort by individuals - and additional 
waste of public resources,21 - policy intervention to alleviate the problems of asymmetric 
                                                 
21 In Spain, as in many other advanced countries, education is highly subsidized (Iriondo and Perez-Amaral, 
2016). 
 
 
 
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IPT
 21 
information needs to be addressed. That is, it is needed not only so that the education 
system can endow individuals with adequate abilities, knowledge, and skills, but also to 
develop a system of credentials that actually convey this information as a proper reflection 
of the worker’s true productivity. Thus, on the one hand, although educational attainments 
or credentials are a national system of recognition and evaluation, a significant 
heterogeneity across university and faculty institutions exists, and the elaboration of 
indices and rankings of such institutions would serve to assess the quality of graduates. 
On the other hand, an important source of asymmetric information is that some skills may 
be unobservable. Effort should be devoted by the public sector to finding some system to 
credit and disseminate reliable information on skills acquired by workers in different 
aspects, such as social ability, relational skills, IQ tests, and so on.  
Some attempts have recently been made in Spain along these lines. Labor market 
policies aiming to increase flexibility and reduce instability have been set up in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession, and seem to have spurred economic growth, even 
though the long-term effects are yet to be realised (the unemployment rate has decreased 
but is still over 15%, with the temporary rate still above 25%). More profound reforms 
aiming to pursue more and better education and training, more research, and more 
innovation are still to come. The problems of political instability should not stand in the 
way of the accomplishment of such policies. 
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TABLE 1 
Definitions and percentages of educational mismatch 
Question 2 
Question 1 
Non-useful skills (0-5 rate) 
25.3% 
Useful skills (6-10 rate) 
74.6% 
Adequately educated (80.7%) Unadjusted (15.4%) Properly matched (65.3%) 
Over-educated (19.3%) Genuinely over-educated (8.8%) Apparently over-educated (10.5%) 
Source: Own elaboration from ECVT 2007-2010. 
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TABLE 2 
Returns to average year of education by group of worker and type of match 
Worker 
Group  Properly Unadjusted 
Apparently 
over-educated 
Genuinely 
over-educated N obs. 
Log L/R2 
Panel A        
Total        
 Wage earners 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 22,530 -35113.85 
 Self-employed 0.040***  0.036* 0.023*** 0.019*** 5,397 -10081.09 
Men        
 Wage earners 0.051*** 0.044*** 0.039*** 0.029*** 13,668 -21606.95 
 Self-employed 0.040*** 0.036**** 0.026*** 0.023*** 3,777 -7069.57 
Women        
 Wage earners 0.063*** 0.055*** 0.051*** 0.042*** 8,862 -12396.41 
 Self-employed 0.044*** 0.034*** 0.029*** 0.023*** 1,620 -2777.59 
        
Panel B. (controlling biases of selectivity)    
Total      
 Wage earners 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.031*** 22,530 -31550.63 
 Self-employed 0.039*** 0.036* 0.021*** 0.018*** 5,397 -9132.33 
Men        
 Wage earners 0.052*** 0.045*** 0.040*** 0.030*** 13,668 -19550.96 
 Self-employed 0.038*** 0.034* 0.021*** 0.018*** 3,777 -6473.86 
Women        
 Wage earners 0.066*** 0.058*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 8,862 -11001.85 
 Self-employed 0.048*** 0.038*** 0.034*** 0.030*** 1,620 -2451.74 
   
Panel C. (Pseudo-panel estimations with sample selection, Wooldridge, 1995)  
   
 Wage earners 0.053*** 0.048*** 0.040*** 0.025*** 1,088 0.48† 
 Self-employed 0.039** 0.039*** 0.017*** 0.009*** 544 0.28† 
Notes: Experience in quadratic terms is also included. †R2. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Source: estimation with ECVT 2007-2010 data.  
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TABLE 3 
Job satisfaction estimation with sample selection. Marginal effects 
  Unadjusted 
Apparently 
over-educated 
Genuinely 
over-educated N obs. Log L R2 
Total        
 Wage earners -0.105*** -0.200*** -0.325*** 20,236 -6671.67 0.04 
 Self-employed -0.050*** -0.216*** -0.271*** 4,901 -4101.52 0.04 
Men        
 Wage earners -0.093*** -0.221*** -0.335*** 12,376 -10187.78 0.04 
 Self-employed -0.042** -0.225*** -0.267*** 3,468 -2883.52 0.04 
Women        
 Wage earners -0.134*** -0.177*** -0.314*** 7,860 -6459.98 0.04 
 Self-employed -0.070* -0.202*** -0.287*** 1,433 -1197.77 0.05 
 
Pseudo-panel estimations with sample selection (Wooldridge, 1995) 
 Wage earners -0.070*** -0.008*** -0.105*** 1,088  0.24 
 Self-employed -0.051*** -0.039*** -0.024*** 544  0.15 
Notes: Other regressors: Gender, experience (quadratic), tenure (quadratic), marital status, first job, industry and 
occupation. Source: estimation with ECVT 2007-2010 data. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  
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TABLE 4 
Job search with sample selection 
  
Unadjusted 
Apparently 
over-educated 
Genuinely 
over-educated N obs. 
Log L 
R2 
Total        
 Wage earners 0.106*** 0.459*** 0.644*** 20,236 -5871.53 0.13 
 Self-employed 0.226*** 0.525*** 0.652*** 4,901 -1030.92 0.08 
Men        
 Wage earners 0.105*** 0.474*** 0.659*** 12,376 -3639.22 0.13 
 Self-employed 0.262*** 0.475*** 0.511*** 3,468 -725.65 0.05 
Women        
 Wage earners 0.109*** 0.426*** 0.612*** 7,860 -2218.55 0.14 
 Self-employed 0.060 0.618*** 0.859*** 1,388 -287.79 0.18 
 
Pseudo-panel estimations with sample selection (Wooldridge, 1995) 
 Wage earners 0.011 0.003*** 0.008*** 1,088  0.11 
 Self-employed 0.014 0.007*** 0.037** 544  0.39 
Notes: Other regressors: Gender, experience (quadratic), tenure (quadratic), marital status, first job, industry, and 
occupation. Source: estimation with ECVT 2007-2010 data. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%.  
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TABLE 5 
Estimation of the LOGSE effect on educational mismatch. Index of LOGSE 
 Total Men  Women 
 Coef 
St 
error 
Log L/ R2adjusted 
Coef 
St 
error 
Log L/  
R2adjusted Coef 
St 
error 
Log L/ R2adjusted 
Ordered probit 0.073*** 0.026 -25,722 0.042 0.035 -15,983 0.111*** 0.041 - 9,523 
Probit 0.048 0.032 -10,917 0.005 0.045 -6,347 0.095** 0.047 -4,520 
OLS 0.058*** 0.020 0.09 0.029 0.026 0.07 0.090*** 0.031 0.13 
N 26,764 16,692 10,072 
Notes: Other regressors: Gender, experience (quadratic), tenure (quadratic), marital status, first job, industry and 
occupation. Source: estimation with ECVT 2007-2010 data. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant 
at 1%.  
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TABLE 6 
Estimation of the LOGSE effect on educational mismatch. Differences in differences 
 Differences in differences Placebo test 1 Placebo test 2 
 Coef St error Coef St error Coef St error 
Treatment -0.077** 0.032 -0.007 0.025 0.091*** 0.019 
Post -0.005 0.023 0.047*** 0.011 0.011 0.029 
Treatment x Post 0.068** 0.031 -0.026 0.024 0.017 0.034 
R2 0.10 0.07 0.10 
N 13,535 14,851 13,535 
High studies       
Treatment -0.025** 0.012 0.003 0.050 0.051 0.040 
Post -0.083 0.050 0.065*** 0.021 -0.080* 0.044 
Treatment x Post 0.017** 0.008 0.019 0.045 0.027 0.048 
R2 0.23 0.19  
N 3,888 3,833  
Secondary studies       
Treatment -0.116** 0.052 0.039 0.048 0.088 0.094 
Post 0.026 0.020 0.088*** 0.020 0.055 0.050 
Treatment x Post 0.100** 0.048 -0.102 0.750 0.012 0.062 
R2 0.10 0.09 0.10 
N 5,077 4,860 5,077 
Notes: Placebo test 1: considers that the region implementing LOGSE first are the 8 to 17 in alphabetic order. 
Placebo test 2: considers that the LOGSE affects only those born between 1965 and 1970. Other regressors: Gender, 
experience (quadratic), tenure (quadratic), marital status, first job, industry and occupation. Source: estimation with 
ECVT 2007-2010 data. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  
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Table A 
Theoretical years of study duration.  
 ISCED97 
classification 
Previous and 
LGE-70 
LOGSE-90 Share (%) 
Illiterate NA 0 0 0.13 
Pre-primary 0 5 6 3.02 
Primary 1 5 6 15.56 
Lower Secondary 2 8 10 21.24 
Upper secondary 3 12 12 10.11 
Vocational short 3 10 12 10.50 
Vocational long/  5B 13 14 13.28 
Short Bachelor 5A, 6 15 15 10.76 
Long Bachelor and above 6, 7, 8 17 17 14.40 
LGE: General Law of Education (LGE acronym in Spanish) lasting from 1970 until 1992. LOGSE: Organic 
Law of Sorted Educational System (LOGSE). It was passed in 1990 and set up in after 1992. 
Share: averaged value from ECVT 2007-2010 data. 
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